The Argentine financial sector: Performance, problems, and policy issues by Fischer, Bernhard & Trapp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Fischer, Bernhard; Trapp, Peter
Working Paper
The Argentine financial sector:
Performance, problems, and policy
issues
Kiel Working Papers, No. 226
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Fischer, Bernhard; Trapp, Peter (1985) : The Argentine financial
sector: Performance, problems, and policy issues, Kiel Working Papers, No. 226, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/46938lere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 226
The Argentine Financial Sector:
Performance, Problems, and Policy Issues
Bernhard
by
Fischer and Peter Trapp
Institut fiir Wfeltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Departments IV and V
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 226
The Argentine Financial Sector:
Performance, Problems, and Policy Issues
Bernhard
by
Fischer and Peter Trapp
February 1985
The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, are solely responsible for the contents and
distribution of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and
suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quo-
tations with them.




II. The Financial System in Argentina
III. Financial Policies, 1973-1984
1. The Economic Background
2. Financial Policies During the 1973-1976 Period
3. Towards Financial Liberalization, 1976-1981
4. Back to Financial Repression, 1982-1984
IV. The Effects of Financial Repression
V. Policies to Restore Financial Markets
References
Abbreviations
Statistical AppendixThe Argentine Financial Sector; Performance, Problems and
Policy Issues
I. Introduction
Argentina has made headlines in the international press not
only because of its external debt problem but also because
of extremely high rates of inflation which reached a peak in
September 1984 when the monthly change of the consumer price
index climbed to 27.5 per cent corresponding to an annual
rate of more than 1700 per cent. For the year 1984 as a
whole the consumer price index rose by 688 per cent. Argen-
tina has a long history of relatively high rates of infla-
tion: From 1955 to 1975 the average annual increase of the
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Source; Fischer, Hiemenz, Trapp, 1984.- 2 -
1976-1983 period the rate rose to 167 per cent (Figure 1) ,
whereas world inflation was of the order of 5.5 and 12.6 per
cent, respectively. The most recent price level increases
mark a (preliminary) record in the post-war period.
From economic history it is well-known that high inflation
impedes the functioning of financial markets, discourages
investment and ultimately erodes the social fabric of the
society (Keynes, 1924). The effects of inflation on growth
and income distribution in Argentina have been discussed
elsewhere (Fischer, Hiemenz, Trapp, 1984).
This paper focusses on the development of the financial
sector under conditions of high inflation. It begins with a
description of the Argentine financial sector (Section II)
and then reviews three distinct periods of financial poli-
cies since the early 1970s (Section III) . In the following
chapter the main effects of financial repression are dis-
cussed and finally some policy suggestions for a restoration
of the financial sector are presented.
II. The Financial System in Argentina
The Argentine financial system consists of a complex insti-
tutional framework with the Central Bank as a monopolistic
supplier of high powered money, the banks and non-financial
institutions acting as intermediaries between savers and
lenders, and a security market .
These institutions constitute the official financial market.
In order to control the expansion of money and credit the
Central Bank determines the deposit and lending rates as
well as the reserve ratios and decides over the amount of
rediscount facilities which are available to banks. Minimum
For a detailed description of the institutional framework
of the Argentine financial sector see Tami, 19 78 and Ro-
driguez, 1979.- 3 -
reserve ratios have been kept at a level close to or even at
100 per cent, because of the inflationary effects of large
scale financing of public sector deficits by Central Bank
credit. In the case of high nominal interest rates the lend-
ing capacity of non-interest bearing demand deposits allows
banks, but not other financial institutions, to realize
considerable profits. In order to avoid discrimination be-
tween banks and non-bank financial institutions the Central
Bank introduced the Monetary Regulation Account (Cuenta de
Regulacion Monetaria - CRM) in 1977 . Under this scheme a
compensation (in the form of interest) is paid for reserves
held by banks on interest bearing deposits and profits
stemming from the lending capacity of demand deposits are
partially taxed away by charging demand deposits with a fee.
The balance of the CRM which depends on the level of nominal
interest rates, the reserve ratio and the deposit structure,
is at present negative and generates, therefore, an operat-
ing deficit of the Central Bank.
In 1983, the deposits collected by the financial system
amounted to some 16.5 per cent of GDP, the volume of credit
to the private sector (excluding Central Bank credit) was of
the order of 9.8 per cent of GDP. About 54 per cent of the
deposits held by the private sector were savings and time
deposits at a regulated (controlled) rate. One third of the
deposits was at a rate indexed to the consumer price index
or the (official) a$/US$ exchange rate. The remainder (12.6
per cent) was held as non-interest bearing demand deposits.
All deposits at the controlled rate - this includes demand
deposits which may not earn interest - are covered by a
state-backed Deposit Insurance System. This government gua-
rantee is regarded as a protection of small savers against
losses from bank failures. Since there is no need to with-
draw insured deposits in the case of a bank crisis it is
For a detailed discussion of the rational and effects of
the Monetary Regulation Account see Fischer and Trapp
(1985).- 4 -
seen as a factor adding to the stability of the financial,
sector. Finally the insurance scheme is to prevent public
banks from enjoying a competitive edge in mobilizing depo-
sits because deposits at these banks are considered to be
without risks due to the public ownership status.
On the lending side 59 per cent of the loans had a regulated
interest rate, one third were index-linked loans and the
remaining 8.6 per cent were granted at a free market inte-
rest rate. About three quarters of the total volume of bank
loans are given to the private sector.
The most important part of the official Argentine financial,
market is the group of commercial banks. In 1982 this group
was composed of 31 public banks and 166 private banks; they
accounted for 82 per cent of the total loan portfolio in
1982 (Table A2). About 40 per cent of these loans came from
official banks. Foreign banks contributed more than 40 per
cent to the credit volume granted by private banks. The
number of domestically-owned private commercial banks ex-
ceeded that of foreign banks by one hundred and of the 133
domestically-owned private banks only 9 per cent provided 68
per cent of the total loans granted by this sub-group. This
indicates a rather uneven distribution of the credit volume
among local banks.
Among the non-bank financial institutions, the most import-
ant ones are the public development banks which accounted
for about 11 per cent of total loans in 1982. The other fi-
nancial institutions are rather insignificant. There were
111 finance companies in 1982 holding a share of only 2.2
per cent of total loans; about one half of the credits pro-
vided by this sub-group was granted by 28 companies.
The security market, once a thriving institution, is only of
minor importance at present. Activities at the stock ex-
change - as recorded by the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange -
have been stagnant since 1975 (Table A6) and the number of\ — 5 ~
firms whose stocks are traded on the exchange has been de-
clining over time. Until 1982 trading in public sector secu-
rities increased steadily. However, since then the govern-
ment has refrained from financing its deficit in the bond
market. Thus, the trade in public sector securities quickly
became insignificant.
In addition to the official market there is an informal,
non-institutionalized market for short term capital (mainly
acceptances). It started as a money market among first-class
corporations but is now believed by many to have developed
into an extensive and rather well-established operation.
According to recent estimates by Central Bank officials the
size of the informal market amounts to 15 per cent of the
volume of the official market. Although the supply of funds
in this market is at least in part at the expense of the
offical market the Central Bank has tolerated the informal
market because it provides an additional source of credit
for those who could not be satisfied in the offical market.
III. Financial Policies, 1973-1984
1. The Economic Background
The Argentine economy has experienced a high degree of in-
stability since 1973 . In 5 out of the 12 years from 1973 to
1984 overall output declined (Table Al) . Real per capita
income in 1984 was some 5 per cent lower than in 1973. Each
downturn was preceded by a balance of payments crisis re-
sulting from overexpansionary policies and real wage hikes
in the previous years. In order to reduce the external defi-
cit each government - usually a new one - took recourse in
heavy devaluations of the Peso, in (relatively) tight mone-
tary and fiscal policies, and real wage cuts. Consequently,
For a more detailed analysis of the economic performance
and economic policies in Argentina see Fischer, Hiemenz,
Trapp (1984).- 6 -
domestic demand contracted sharply, imports dropped and
exports recovered somewhat. However, as soon as the balance
of payments constraint no longer seemed to be a problem more
expansionary policies were pursued in order to avoid social
tensions. Real wages were allowed to rise again and domestic
demand recovered briskly. The main instrument to reduce
inflation was seen in a fixed exchange rate. However, since
domestic policies were not geared to the exchange rate tar-
get, this policy was bound to lead to a new balance of pay-
ments crisis sooner or later.
In fact, despite the attempt to import price stability via a
fixed exchange rate, inflation was extremely high and var-
iable since 1973. From 1974 to 1976 the increase in consumer
price rose from 24 to 441 per cent. After declining gradual-
ly to about 100 per cent in 1980 it started to accelerate
again and climbed to 688 per cent in 1984. Financial poli-
cies have contributed heavily to the fluctuations of output
and inflation rates; at the same time these developments
have impeded severely the functioning of financial markets.
In order to show the effects of financial policies on the
financial sector more clearly some sub-periods shall be
analysed in the following.
2. Financial Policies During the 1973-1976 Period
The election of 1973 ended a long period of military rule
and brought a Peronist government into office. The main
economic objectives of the new administration were to raise
real wages and to stimulate economic activity. Public expen-
ditures were allowed to increase markedly; the public sector
deficit rose from 7.3 per cent of GDP in 1973 to some 15 per
cent in 1975. In order to satisfy the public borrowing re-
quirements smoothly, private bank deposits were nationalized
in September 1973 by means of a 100 per cent minimum reserve
ratio, i.e. banks had to take over part of the government
debt. Under this system of nationalized deposits commercial- 7 -
banks and other financial institutions acted only as agents
of the Central Bank. Deposit and lending rates were deter-
mined by the Central Bank and interest payments due were
credited and debited by the financial institutions on behalf
of the Central Bank. To reimburse banks for their services
the Central Bank paid a commission fee on deposits and
granted a certain spread on interest rates for credits.
Under the 100 per cent reserve system the Central Bank had
full control over bank lending by determining the rediscount
facilities of each bank. In addition, the Central Bank
established limits, conditions and guarantees on banks'
portfolios. Within these regulations banks were responsible
for the distribution of credits and for the investment of
funds.
Low interest rates were regarded as a prerequisite for a
high rate of growth. Therefore the real rate of interest was
kept at a level close to zero at the beginning and the ex-
pansion of the money supply was allowed to accelerate (Table
A3) . Until 1974 price increases were suppressed by strict
controls. However, when the expansion of domestic demand
gained momentum it became more and more difficult to keep
inflationary pressures under control. Black markets for all
kinds of products emerged and in 1975, despite price con-
trols, there was a virtual price explosion. Since the ad-
justment of nominal interest rates did not keep pace with
the increase of the inflation rate, real interest rates on
most financial assets became highly negative (Table 1). This
led to a rapid expansion of the informal acceptance market.
Due to the extremely high opportunity costs of holding non-
interest bearing money and time and savings deposits (at a
negative real rate of interest) the real value of private
sector holdings of financial assets declined sharply (Table
A4) . The relation of Ml to GDP fell from 14.8 per cent in
1974 to 6.7 per cent in 1976 . The reduction of time and
These numbers refer to bank deposits only.— ff —
Table 1 - Selected Interest Rates, Argentina 1978-1984/11
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tions .- 9 -
savings deposits was even more pronounced since there was an
expectation of a massive devaluation of the Peso which caus-
ed an outright flight from the domestic currency in late
1975 and early 1976. Everybody tried to shift from domestic
financial assets into real assets or foreign exchange thus
intensifying inflation and the devaluation of the Peso in
the black market. The result was that the ratio of M2 to GDP
dropped from 26.3 per cent in 1974 to 9.6 per cent in 1976
(Table 2) .
3. Towards Financial Liberalization, 1976-1981
At the beginning of 1976 the government had totally lost
control over the situation. The rate of inflation reached an
annual rate of 900 per cent, speculation was mushrooming,
foreign exchange reserves were depleted and social unrest
and guerilla activities put the society at the brink of
dissolution. In the spring a military government took office
and adopted immediately a stabilization plan: The public
sector deficit was reduced drastically, the expansion of
monetary aggregates was halved, real wages were cut by
roughly one third, price controls were partially abolished,
the Peso was devalued and trade as well as financial markets
were partially liberalized. As a result domestic demand fell
sharply, the current account moved into surplus and infla-
tion stabilized at monthly rates of about 8 per cent. Specu-
lation subsided and as real interest rates turned positive
in the course of 1976 holdings of time and savings deposits
(in real terms) increased markedly (Table A4) . From 1976 to
1977 the M2/GDP ratio recovered by 4 percentage points.
However, the holdings of non-interest bearing assets (Ml)
were kept at a low level in view of the persistently high
rate of inflation (Table 2).
Whereas in the first phase the policy was dominated by typi-
cal stabilization measures, in 1977 there were pronounced- 10 -
Table 2 - Liquidity Coefficients , Argentina 1970-1984
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prices. -
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efforts to adopt a market oriented policy. The liberaliza-
tion period is closely related to the person of Martinez de
Hoz, the Minister of Economics of the new government . This
policy brought significant changes to the financial sector.
Under the liberalization program of 1977/78 the nationaliza-
tion of deposits was abandoned and replaced by a fractional
reserve system. Open market operations were to be the main
instrument to control monetary expansion. In order to pre-
vent a monetary explosion in the transition period minimum
reserve requirements had to be fixed at a relatively high
level and the Monetary Regulation Account was installed in
order to cope with the effects of high reserve ratios and
high interest rates on non-bank financial institutions.
Interest rates were liberalized and to enforce competition
in the financial market barriers to entry were removed for
both domestic and foreign banks. Under certain conditions
non-bank financial institutions were allowed to be trans-
formed into banks and the regulations for branch expansion
were eased.
The deregulation of interest rates resulted in a further
increase in real interest rates for deposits, i.e., for the
first time in years savers were able to protect their sav-
ings against inflation. There was a dramatic increase of
savings channeled through the banking system and thus mone-
tization was raised (Table 2) . The increase of financial
savings also allowed a two-fold increase in the volume of
credit. The build-up of deposits, which was backed by new
confidence in the Peso and repatriation of capital, was
somewhat stronger than the growth of credits, thus the banks
were able to increase their holdings of foreign assets (IMF,
1983). At the same time the share of credits granted to the
private sector rose substantially because the public sector
This period can only be outlined in the context of this
paper. It has been intensively analyzed in the literature.
See f.i. Canitrot, 1981, Gaba, 1981 and Barletta, Blejer,
Landau, 1983, Nogues, 1985.- 12 -
deficit had been cut by two third. Due to the expansion of
financial markets in real terms the number of banks almost
doubled from 1976 to 1979 and the number of branches in-
creased by 28 per cent.
Despite the policy change the inflation rate remained stub-
bornly high. This was due to increasing capital inflows
which led to a higher-than-intended growth of the monev
supply. Therefore, in April 1978 the exchange rate was
allowed to float freely. The Central Bank justified this
step by stating that according to the monetary approach of
the balance of payments it was either able to fix the ex-
change rate and to treat the money supply as an endogenous
variable or to control domestic monetary expansion and leave
the exchange rate determination to the market (Beccaria,
Carciofi, 1982, p. 156). Initially, the Central Bank chose
the latter option. However, since this strategv failed to
bring down the inflation rate, it switched to the opposite
policy in 1979. A pre-announced crawling peg was introduced
with a decreasing rate of depreciation (tablita) . This was
intended to gradually reduce inflation expectation and the
differential between domestic inflation and world inflation.
In this context, monetary expansion was to be considered as
an endogenous variable. Actually, however, monetary growth
was not allowed to adjust smoothly to lower inflation rates,
on the contrary, the public sector deficit widened again and
the expansion of Ml accelerated in 1979. Since inflation
rates did not decline in line with the schedule of decreas-
ing devaluations the competitive position of the industry,
which by partial trade liberalization had been exposed to
international competition, deteriorated. This was made worse
by a marked increase in real wages in 1979 and 1980. In view
of continuing high rates of inflation and a marked deterio-
ration of the external position expectations of a devalua-
tion began to emerge. The government tried to defend the
exchange rate schedule: capital inflows were attracted by
guaranteed rates of return in terms of foreign currency andi^tarhaft Kiel
borrowing abroad was encouraged by offering forward market
contracts. However, after adjusting the exchange rate sche-
dule several times the exchange rate policy was no longer
credible, the crawling peg had to be given up. In the end
the government had accumulated huge liabilities through
exchange rate guarantees, the total external debt of the
country had tripled within four years and the financial
position of the industrial sector was bleak.
Predictably, this created acute problems in the Argentine
banking sector. In 1982, a large share of the credit volume,
which had been massively expanded in the preceding years,
was on the brink of becoming non-performing. In addition,
the banks suffered from a sharp decrease in the real volume
of deposits due to foreign exchange speculation (Table A4).
The liquidity ratio M2/GDP, which had risen to more than 25
per cent in 1980, fell again to some 15 per cent.
In the literature the problems of the industrial sector and
the banking system have sometimes been attributed to vola-
tile and excessively high interest rates after the financial
reform (Carbajal, 1980) as well as to other characteristics
of the financial system like the high share of short-term
lending, the short-term and unstable nature of deposits, the
difficulties of extending maturities of loans, the weak
portfolio position of many private domestic banks, and lack
of sufficient supervision over financial institutions.
It has, however, to be pointed out, that the difficulties in
the financial sector did not arise from the key elements of
the financial reform program but were rather associated with
the insufficient implementation of domestic stabilization
policies and the attempt to keep inflation under control by
an overvalued exchange rate (Sjaastad, 1983) . The enormous
rise of interest rates in the late 70's and early 80 's was
primarily due to the lack of credibility in the exchange
rate policy, in view of the renewed increase of the public
sector deficit and the persistently high level of inflation.- 14 -
The lesson to be learned from this experience is clear: it
is of utmost importance that stabilization policies are
internally consistent and credible, particularly when (fi-
nancial) markets are free (Nogues, 1985, p. 2) . The lack of
a comprehensive trade liberalization policy at that time was
another obstacle for the reform program to be successful
(Wogart, 1983).
4. Back to Financial Repression, 1982-1984
In June 1982, when a new administration - the 6th since 1973
- under General Bignone came into office the Argentine eco-
nomy was characterized by a severe financial and foreign
exchange crisis, a dramatic increase in the public sector
deficit, high inflation rates as well as by depressed and
declining economic activity. In July 1982, a so-called fi-
nancial reform package was introduced in order to improve
the efficiency of the banking system and to lengthen the
maturity of the financial saving instruments. With these
measures the government gave up the market-oriented approach
and re-established a centralized financial system. Interest
rates on short-term financial liabilities with a government
guarantee were controlled and a ceiling on deposits with a
maturity of up to 89 days was introduced. The indexation of
financial assets of one-year maturity or longer was re-
stricted and financial institutions were allowed to issue
non-indexed certificates of deposit of 90-days maturity or
longer at free market interest rates. However, the amount of
such deposits was limited. Additionally, banks were autho-
rized to pay interest on demand deposits at a maximum rate
of 2.5 per cent per month. Finally, a 100 per cent reserve
requirement was imposed on all above mentioned deposits
except the non-regulated 90-day or longer deposits.
To ease the debt burden of the private sector and to promote
economic recovery a rediscount facility (prestamo basico)
was offered by the Central Bank for a rescheduling of the
private sector debt. Initially a charge of 5.6 % per month- 15 -
was imposed on the financial institutions, the interest rate
ceiling for final borrowers was 6 %; this implied a highly
negative rate in real terms. Such loans had to be repaid in
60 equal monthly installments thus the maturity exceeded by
far those that were available in the market. There were even
slightly better terms for mortgage loans. Through this debt
rescheduling scheme part of the inflation tax revenues was
channeled into the industrial sector in order to improve the
financial position of companies.
However, since macroeconomic policies were not geared to
reducing inflation and improving the competitiveness of the
industry the result of the July 1982 reform was rather dis-
appointing in terms of the objectives to be achieved. Nei-
ther the envisaged readjustment of the private sector port-
folios towards lengthening the maturities of both deposits
and liabilities nor the economic recovery took place. The
real rate of interest became highly negative as a result of
the inflationary impact of the large Peso devaluation of
July 1982 and the implementation of the financial reform. As
a consequence savers switched from Peso-denominated finan-
cial assets to physical assets or foreign currency, thus
causing again a rapid financial disintermediation (Table 2).
In the short run the measures led to an alleviation of cor-
porate and household indebtedness and therefore to an im-
provement in the financial institutions' portfolio, however,
this was only possible because of substantial interest sub-
sidies to borrowers. The implicit real annual lending inte-
rest rate amounted to around -T60 per cent per annum. But as
the Peso was not allowed to more strongly depreciate the
competitiveness of the industry remained low and economic
recovery did not take place. Therefore, the portfolio im-
provement of firms and financial institutions proved only to
be temporary and extremely costly.
In December 1983 when the Alfonsin administration came into
office, it announced the replacement of the 100 per cent- 16 -
reserve requirement system which covered most kinds of depo-
sits by a fractional reserve system. However, the reserve
quotas remained extremely high to keep bank credits at a low
level in face of the huge fiscal deficit financed directly
by printing money. Therefore, monetary expansion resulted
mainly from a deficit-induced expansion of% the monetary base
and only to a small degree from bank lending.
On the whole, the basic framework of the 1982 reform was
maintained by the monetary authorities in order to avoid
further disruptions in the financial system. Regulated in-
terest rates were raised but by far not sufficiently to
become positive in real terms. Therefore, the decline in
real money balances continued thus reducing the real lending
capacity of the banks even more. In fact, total bank depo-
sits amounted to only 6 per cent of GDP at the end of 1984
and credits to the private sector had declined by some 50
per cent in real terms since 1982. The overwhelming share of
deposits was of a very short-term nature, i.e. depositors
temporarily took advantage of high nominal interest rates
and tried to switch into US-dollars before the interest dif-
ferential was eaten up by the devaluation of the Peso. Part
of the business was taking place in the informal money mar-
ket which was flourishing due to the shortage of funds and
credits in the official market.
The capital market has been non-existent for several years
because of expectations of persistently high rates of infla-
tion and continuing devaluation of the Peso. Even if there
were a supply of medium or long-term funds at positive real
rates of interest, demand would be very low because of the
risk of any longer-term investment. The longer the time
horizon of the project the higher is the uncertainty con-
cerning the development of relative prices. Although this is
true for any investment project it becomes more important
under conditions of high inflation. With lending rates in- 17 -
the order of more than 500 per cent per annum any decline of
the relative price of the own product would inevitably
create heavy liquidity problems. Thus long-term investment
projects can only be carried out, when government loans at
negative real interest rates are available and when interest
payments due cansbe capitalized. But even in such cases it
is much more attractive to reinvest funds in the informal
money market or in foreign exchange than in production capa-
cities.
IV. The Effects of Financial Repression
The main instrument of financial repression in the period
since 1973 has been the combination of negative real in-
terest rates and high inflation. The continuing erosion of
the purchasing power of money represents a massive tax on
currency holdings and on demand deposits. Because of the
high opportunity costs of holding money Ml in per cent of
GDP declined from about 15 per cent in 1974 to some 4 per
cent in 1984 (Table 2). This demonetization implies a loss
in overall economic wealth because of the services of money
forgone.
At the same time, the ability of the financial sector to
mobilize domestic savings has been reduced by the maintain-
ance of negative real rates of interest. Since there was no
way to protect financial assets from purchasing power losses
savers increasingly turned to real assets (real estate) and
foreign exchange as alternative investment possibilities. As
a result, deposits held at commercial banks fell from 25 per
cent of GDP at the beginning of the 70's to 11 per cent in
1984. Thus the depth of the financial sector has deteriorat-
ed markedly over the last 15 years. Compared to countries
like Brazil and South Korea, which in per-capita-income
terms rank below Argentina, the deposit-income ratio in
Argentina reached a very low level in 1983 (Table 3).- 18 -
Table 3 - Real Per-Capita Income and the Ratio of Money (M2)
a to Gross
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Since inflation rates proved to be highly variable nominal
interest rates were fluctuating heavily too. Under such
circumstances any longer term fixing of interest rates was
out of question. Indexation was possible to some extent,
however, due to a lagged adjustment of interest rates to
price level or exchange rate changes, it did not offer full
protection. Another factor reducing the effectiveness of in-
dexation is the variability of relative prices which to a
large degree stems from price controls and exchange rate
manipulation. Therefore, most savings are concentrated on
deposits with a very short time to maturity (less than thir-
ty days) . In view of the lack of any long-term funds the
supply of long-term credits and mortgages has completely
dried out.
Demonetization and financial disintermediation have led to
an erosion of the base from which the inflation tax is levi-
ed. The attempt to continue to finance the public sector
deficit by the printing press resulted in a further increase
in inflation rates. This has accelerated the process of
disintermediation: The flight from the domestic currency has
intensified. It is estimated that foreign financial assets
in US-dollars of Argentine residents amount to more than
20 bill. $ and increase at an annual rate of 3 bill. $. At
the same time the propensity to invest in production capa-
cities at home dropped sharply in view of the gains offered
by foreign currency investments. Gross domestic investment
fell by about 50 per cent from 1980 to 1984, and the share
of investment in GDP declined from more than 20 per cent to
less than 10 per cent. Thus domestic capital formation has
been severely impeded by financial repression.
Because of the marked decline of the supply of deposits (in
real terms) and large-scale public sector borrowing the
volume of credits available for the private sector shrank
over the last years. Demand for credit, however, exceeded
supply by a substantial amount given negative real interest- 20 -
rates. In fact, negative real interest rates imply a heavy
subsidization of lenders at the expense of the holders of
financial assets. Therefore, credits had to be rationed by
the Central Bank or in an informal way. This means, that the
allocation of credit was not governed by efficiency criteria
but by factors such as lobbyist activites, the existence of
interlocking ownership between companies and banks or the
possibility of mobilizing government support.
In view of the progressive dissolution of the financial
system since 1982 it is important to keep in mind that dur-
ing the liberalization period from 1976 to 1981 the economy
strongly responded to interest rate incentives. When real
interest rates were allowed to become positive financial
intermediation was restored quickly and the confidence in
the financial sector grew. The volume of deposits and cred-
its rose vigorously and the banking sector expanded. The go-
vernment was even able to finance part of the public sector
deficit by selling long-term bonds.
Unfortunately, however, another source of financial repres-
sion was introduced during the liberalization period by
bringing about a real appreciation of the Peso. While the
overvaluation of the domestic currency was intended to re-
duce inflationary tendencies, it was at the same time equi-
valent to an undervaluation of foreign financial assets. As
a consequence capital outflows occurred - even when foreign
exchange transactions were controlled - and the attractive-
ness of the country for foreign . investors suffered. Up
through mid-1982 the government made the situation worse by
offering exchange rate guarantees for capital inflows and
borrowing abroad to defend the exchange rate schedule; i.e.,
economic policy subsidized the purchase of foreign assets.
Ultimately, as a result of expansionary domestic policies,
there was a massive capital flight - it is estimated that in
1982/83 more than 20 billions US-$ were transferred abroad -- 21 -
and a huge foreign debt amounting to about 45 billion US-$
was accumulated, causing debt service obligations which
greatly exceeded the country's capacity.
After the liberalization experiment had failed, not because
liberalization was inadequate but because of an inconsistent
mix of macroeconomic policies, negative real interest rates
were reimposed and the financial sector began to shrink
again. From 1977 to 1984 the number of financial institu-
tions operating in Argentina declined from 723 to 380. While
concentration in the financial sector increased, the banks
extended the number of branches from 3300 to 4400 in order
to improve the collection of deposits. However, this attempt
to increase bank revenues failed because of the marked de-
cline in the real volume of deposits. Therefore, operating
costs of the banks in relation to overall business increased
considerably.
According to World Bank estimates administrative costs as
per cent of the total loan portfolio amounted to 13 per cent
for state and municipal banks. The corresponding figure for
commercial banks (10 per cent) was somewhat lower but still
distinctly higher than in other countries. For the Chilean
banking system for instance administration costs amounted on
average to 5 per cent of total loans in 1982. Over the last
years, the per unit operational costs are likely to have
increased even more in Argentina, due to a further shrinking
of the relative size of the financial system and to the
increasingly short-term character of financial assets.
Thus, while the government succeeded in preserving a diver-
sified structure of the financial sector it was not able to
prevent a decline of the market as a whole. Furthermore, the
deposit insurance has ultimately contributed to make the- 22 -
financial market more unstable . Due to the insurance savers
had no reason to apply risk considerations when a deposit
was made at a bank or non-bank financial institution. Since
banks were granted a fixed spread on the lending business by
the Central Bank and given the uniform low risk premium
charged to the various financial institutions with differing
risks, there was no incentive to take into account profita-
2 bility and solvency criteria . Thus, when the private sector
incurred financial difficulties because of the devaluation
of the Peso and excessive foreign borrowing, banks were hea-
vily affected too. By granting medium term consolidation
loans at a highly subsidized rate the government warded off
a collaps. But since no fundamental reorientation of busi-
ness activities followed the position of many companies and
banks remained weak. According to the Minister of Economics
some 200 of the 380 financial institutions operating in 1984
would not have been able to survive without government sup-
port. However, under the present system of regulations there
is hardly scope for financial institutions to play a more
active role in the intermediation process and to improve
their position. Deposit and lending rates are determined by
the Central Bank and the lending capacity is very limited.
Thus, there is no incentive to compete for deposits by se-
curing a high and secure flow of revenues from lending and
other investment. Instead of financing private investment
projects with the expectation of high yields banks are risk
adverse and prefer to but their money into enterprises which
are state-owned or backed by government guarantees. From a
macroeconomic point of view this has led to a highly ineffi-
cient allocation of capital.
For a critical assessment of the Argentine deposit insur-
ance system see Fernandez, 1980 and 1983.
2
The insurance premium is charged on the basis of a flat
rate equal to 0.03 per cent of average monthly deposits.- 23 -
V. Policies to Restore Financial Markets
At present the Argentine financial sector can barely fulfill
its functions as a mobilizer of savings, as a clearing house
for transforming risks and maturities, and as an efficient
allocator of the funds _to investors. In fact, financial
institutions are no more than executive agents of the Cen-
tral Bank.
Both, high inflation rates and policy-induced distortions
contribute to the severe financial repression. Any attempt
to reestablish the functioning of the financial sector and
to stop financial repression must therefore include a stra-
tegy of disinflation and a deregulation of the financial
sector . For a credible anti-inflation policy it is first
and above all necessary to cut the public sector deficit
drastically in order to reduce the deficit-induced expansion
of the monetary base. To reduce the recessionary effects of
a sharp curtailment of monetary expansion production incen-
tives should be restored immediately by eliminating price
controls, adopting a freely floating exchange rate, and
abolishing trade restrictions, in particular the taxes on
agricultural exports. Indexation should be made available in
2
order to smooth the adjustment to lower inflation rates .
In principle, the reform of the financial sector requires a
freeing of interest rates and a thorough deregulation of
other distortions. However, in the short run a comprehensive
reform may not be suitable in order not to endanger the
price stabilization plan. A cut of reserve ratios, for in-
stance, which would enable banks to noticeably extend lend-
ing activities, does not actually represent a policy option
since the increase in high powered money would fuel infla-
tion and offset the effects of a declining public deficit on
For a more detailed discussion of the rationale of such an
anti-inflation program see Fischer, Hiemenz, Trapp, 1984.
2
For a theoretical discussion of indexation see Friedman,
1974.- 24 -
the money supply. Furthermore, if interest rates for all
loans would be suddenly freed and would turn positive in
real terms the service payments on the existing loans would
probably cause substantial financial difficulties for many
companies. Thus, it would be necessary to adjust (subsidiz-
ed) interest rates on existing loans gradually to market
levels.
But even if the complete revival of the functions of banking
sector rather constitute a long term option, some immediate
policy changes are required to increase savings and to im-
prove the allocation of financial resources. A number of
measures can be implemented to this end while anti-infla-
tionary budget policies are pursued
- interest rates for new deposits and credit arrangements
should be market-determined in order to reestablish a
positive real rate of interest,
- an increase in indexed deposits to promote the flow of
funds to the financial sector through a more rapid and
adequate adjustment of nominal interest rates to the rate
of inflation,
- an increase in the volume of bank acceptances to enlarge
the volume of credit available at freely floating interest
rates.
Such measures would impose a more active role on the banking
sector in the allocation of credit and thus increase compe-
tition among those demanding credit and among the banks
themselves.
A carefully designed policy to reduce the deposit guarantee
system of the Central Bank would also contribute to more
competition in the financial system. To avoid an outflow of
deposit from private banks to official banks the latter
should be restricted to hold demand deposits and be obliged
to refinance themselves by issuing indexed bonds. As a desi-- 25 -
rable result the state-owned part of banking sector would
shrink thus improving the overall efficiency of this sector.
The introduction of more competition would probably contri-
bute to reduce the number banks and, thus, lead to more con-
centration in financial markets, however, the gain in effi-
ciency through more operations on a large scale base would
clearly outweigh this effect. Finally, the role of the Cen-
tral Bank should be restricted to supervising the behavior
of the banking system but not to intervene into the finan-
cial process.
With a reduction of the inflation rate and a more competi-
tive structure of the financial sector the Central Bank can
move towards full interest rate liberalization. A reduction
of the legal reserve requirements, the privatisation of the
deposit guarantee scheme and a dismantling of the monetary
regulation account would give back to the financial sector
its original responsibility in the financial intermediation
process and allow the Central Bank to fulfill its role as a
supervisor of the financial system.- 26 -
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At 1970 constant prices; HNon-financial public sector; Currency in circulation and demand deposits;
 C72onsumer prices of Greater
Buenos Aires, annual average;
 e$ a per US-$; Since 1982 parallel market;
 gIncludes net current transfers; (-) increase in reser-
ves;
 1Estimate.
































































































9. Total 413 100.0 1 615.7 100.0 167.6 100.0
.Composed by banks owned by the federal government, state governments and municipalities.
Official and private domestic and foreign banks.
Source: BCRA.Table A3 - Private Sector Holdings of Financial Assets, Argentina, 1970-83*
(Millions of peso stocks at the end of the year)
Monev Quasi-Monev
















































































































































Does not include deposits issued by non-bank financial institutions. - Defined as Ml plus quasi-money.
c d
Includes acceptances issued by finance companies. - Defined as M2 plus acceptances.


































































aDoes not include deposits issued by non-bank financial
^institutions. Deflated by the wholesale price index (1970=100),
millions of pesos. Not adjusted for changes in reserve ratios.
-
 Clst half of 1984.































































Ml/Monetary base. - 1st. Quarter,
Source: BCRA.Table A6 - Buenos Aires Stock Exchange Transactions in Pri-
vate and Public Security, Argentina, 1960-1982
Public Securities Private Securities No. of Cor-
Year Total porations
(US-$) (p;c.) (US-$) (p.c.) traded
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Source:
20.0
15.2
103.5
1339.1
3157.0
803.6
1377.9
1179.0
1048.1
1530.8
1633.8
Buenos Aires
4.8
19.4
63.5
98.1
86.6
77.2
76.0
43.9
48.4
82.9
90.6
Stock
398.2
63.1
59.4
19.1
486.8
237.1
435.6
1507.3
1115.5
316.7
170.3
Exchange.
95.2
80.6
36.5
1.4
13.4
22.8
24.0
56.1
51.6
17.1
9.4
418.2
78.3
162.9
1358.2
3643.8
1040.7
1813.5
2686.3
2163.6
1847.5
1804.1
522
568
414
322
309
303
296
287
278
263
248